Cyrus seems to be very social and affectionate
Whenever he sees another child, he goes directly to him or her and gives a hug and kiss. He is not shy at all. He loves other babies.
If the other kid is a year or two older than he is, they often hug back and reciprocate or at least let Cyrus finish his hug.
However, if they are smaller they push back and get upset. That is when Cyrus gets upset too.
This make me think who soon people need to learn about healthy social behavior?! I think Soon he needs to learn ‘not everyone is receptive of hugs and kisses especially if it is unsolicited.’ He needs to control his urge for giving too much love and care or he gets hurt later on. One should deserve it and exhibit maturity for getting love and affection.
I got so many lessons to teach him hopefully, he does not turn out to be like me… Poor baby…
Friday, June 18, 2010
Saturday, February 06, 2010
Bath of Princes
Name of this place was 'Bath of Princes."
It was inside the carpet bazar in Esfahan. I don't recall seeing it before.
I was interested in seeing the inside but was it was closed for renovation.
It was inside the carpet bazar in Esfahan. I don't recall seeing it before.
I was interested in seeing the inside but was it was closed for renovation.
Pleasure
One of the pleasures in the world for a parent I think, is to see pure joy on the face of his toddler when he gets a piece of Chocolate... :) it is hard to describe.
(but it should not happen very often...)
(but it should not happen very often...)
Thursday, January 28, 2010
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This was a long article and I could not cut it shorter than this.
I found it very interesting. It seems like it tells me having virtues is somewhat inherent to the person!
Use the link to read the entire article if you will.
2. Virtue, practical wisdom and eudaimonia
A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a "desirable" or "morally valuable" character trait. It is, indeed a character trait — that is, a disposition which is well entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say "goes all the way down", unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker — but the disposition in question, far from being a single track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain reasons, is multi-track. It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. (Hence the extreme recklessness of attributing a virtue on the basis of a single action.)
The most significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a certain range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing, and does not cheat. If such actions are done merely because the agent thinks that honesty is the best policy, or because they fear being caught out, rather than through recognising "To do otherwise would be dishonest" as the relevant reason, they are not the actions of an honest person. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, always tells the truth, nor even as one who always tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. The honest person recognises "That would be a lie" as a strong (though perhaps not overriding) reason for not making certain statements in certain circumstances, and gives due, but not overriding, weight to "That would be the truth" as a reason for making them.
An honest person's reasons and choices with respect to honest and dishonest actions reflect her views about honesty and truth — but of course such views manifest themselves with respect to other actions, and to emotional reactions as well. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed by dishonest means rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on.
Given that a virtue is such a multi-track disposition, it would obviously be reckless to attribute one to an agent on the basis of a single observed action or even a series of similar actions, especially if you don't know the agent's reasons for doing as she did. (Sreenivasan 2002) Moreover, to possess, fully, such a disposition is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal. (Athanassoulis 2000.) Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree, for most people who can be truly described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can be truly described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots — little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent.
Further, it is not easy to get one's emotions in harmony with one's rational recognition of certain reasons for action. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. Following (and adapting) Aristotle, virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and "continence", or strength of will. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.
Describing the continent as "falling short" of perfect virtue appears to go against the intuition that there is something particularly admirable about people who manage to act well when it is especially hard for them to do so, but the plausibility of this depends on exactly what "makes it hard." (Foot 1978, 11-14.) If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts — say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse, or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help — then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character - the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others — then it is not.
I found it very interesting. It seems like it tells me having virtues is somewhat inherent to the person!
Use the link to read the entire article if you will.
2. Virtue, practical wisdom and eudaimonia
A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a "desirable" or "morally valuable" character trait. It is, indeed a character trait — that is, a disposition which is well entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say "goes all the way down", unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker — but the disposition in question, far from being a single track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain reasons, is multi-track. It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. (Hence the extreme recklessness of attributing a virtue on the basis of a single action.)
The most significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a certain range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing, and does not cheat. If such actions are done merely because the agent thinks that honesty is the best policy, or because they fear being caught out, rather than through recognising "To do otherwise would be dishonest" as the relevant reason, they are not the actions of an honest person. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, always tells the truth, nor even as one who always tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. The honest person recognises "That would be a lie" as a strong (though perhaps not overriding) reason for not making certain statements in certain circumstances, and gives due, but not overriding, weight to "That would be the truth" as a reason for making them.
An honest person's reasons and choices with respect to honest and dishonest actions reflect her views about honesty and truth — but of course such views manifest themselves with respect to other actions, and to emotional reactions as well. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed by dishonest means rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on.
Given that a virtue is such a multi-track disposition, it would obviously be reckless to attribute one to an agent on the basis of a single observed action or even a series of similar actions, especially if you don't know the agent's reasons for doing as she did. (Sreenivasan 2002) Moreover, to possess, fully, such a disposition is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal. (Athanassoulis 2000.) Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree, for most people who can be truly described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can be truly described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots — little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent.
Further, it is not easy to get one's emotions in harmony with one's rational recognition of certain reasons for action. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. Following (and adapting) Aristotle, virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and "continence", or strength of will. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.
Describing the continent as "falling short" of perfect virtue appears to go against the intuition that there is something particularly admirable about people who manage to act well when it is especially hard for them to do so, but the plausibility of this depends on exactly what "makes it hard." (Foot 1978, 11-14.) If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts — say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse, or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help — then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character - the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others — then it is not.
"Just Listen"...
I came across this interesting check list, and thought of sharing it...
The Narcissist Inventory* rating the person on a 1-to-3 scale (1 = rarely; 2 = sometimes; 3 = frequently):
How often does the person need to be right at all costs?
How often does the person act impatient with you for no good reason?
How often does the person interrupt you in the middle of what you're saying, and yet take offense if you interrupt?
How often does the person expect you to drop whatever you're thinking about and listen to him or her--and does the person take offense when you expect the same in return?
How often does the person talk more than he or she listens?
How often does the person say "Yes, but," "That's not true," "No," "However," or "Your problem is"?
How often does the person resist and resent doing something that matters to you, just because it's inconvenient?
How often does the person expect you to cheerfully do something that's inconvenient for you?
How often does the person expect you to accept behavior that he or she would refuse to accept from you?
How often does the person fail to say "Thank you," "I'm sorry," "Congratulations," or "Excuse me" when it's called for?
To score your inventory, add up the total:
10-16 =The person is cooperative
17-23 = The person is argumentative
24-30 = The person is a narcissist
And by the way, narcissists not only come in the aggressive type that we are so used to. Excessively needy people who whine, complain, make excuses and feel sorry for themselves can also exhibit many of the behaviors in the Narcissist Inventory and can be just as "self-involved" as the more aggressive variety.
From:
Just Listen: Discover the Secret to Getting Through to Absolutely Anyone. By: Goulston M.D. and Keith Ferrazzi
Sunday, January 17, 2010
Copper-smith bazar In Esfahan
Even though this profession is not very economically sound any more, for sake of tourism in Esfahan (Iran) copper-smiths still work and show their crafts, and truly do a great job.
I hope they can continue this work and transfer their skills to future generations...
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Friday, November 20, 2009
From Sohrab Sepehri...
I’ve never seen two rival pines.
I’ve never seen a willow, Sell its shadow to the earth.
An oak happily offersIts branch to the raven.
And wherever there is a leaf,
in me, passion blossoms.
"Sohrab"
I’ve never seen a willow, Sell its shadow to the earth.
An oak happily offersIts branch to the raven.
And wherever there is a leaf,
in me, passion blossoms.
"Sohrab"
Wednesday, October 28, 2009
I am and I am not...
I said I shall tell the tale of my heart as best as I can;
Caught in the storm of my tears, with a bleeding heart,I failed to do that!I tried to relate to event in broken, muted words;
The cup of my thoughts was so fragile, that I fell into pieces like shattered glass.
Many ships were wrecked in this storm;What is my little helpless boat in comparison?
The waves destroyed my ship, neither good remained nor bad;
Free from myself, I tied my body to a raft.
Now, I am neither up nor down-no this is not a fair description;
I am up on a wave one instant, and down under another the next.
I am not aware of my existence, I know only this:
When I am, I am not, and when I am not, I am!
(Divan 1419:1-6)
Caught in the storm of my tears, with a bleeding heart,I failed to do that!I tried to relate to event in broken, muted words;
The cup of my thoughts was so fragile, that I fell into pieces like shattered glass.
Many ships were wrecked in this storm;What is my little helpless boat in comparison?
The waves destroyed my ship, neither good remained nor bad;
Free from myself, I tied my body to a raft.
Now, I am neither up nor down-no this is not a fair description;
I am up on a wave one instant, and down under another the next.
I am not aware of my existence, I know only this:
When I am, I am not, and when I am not, I am!
(Divan 1419:1-6)
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